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Abstract:  
This paper examines the impact of children on female wages in the UK using the National 
Child Development Study.  Empirically this involves using an extension of the Roy model, 
which simultaneously corrects for the endogeneity of labour force participation and fertility.  
The wage differential between women without children and women with children is estimated 
to range between 19% and 22% not accounting for endogeneity.  This result confirms the 
findings of many previous studies, however, the results indicate substantial non-random 
selection into employment for women hence leading to biased OLS estimates.  The wage 
differential reduces to 16%-18% instrumenting participation and fertility, however, using the 
estimates obtained from the double-selection model, the wage differential between mothers and 














The data was supplied by the Economic and Research Council’s Data Archive at the University of Essex and are 





The past 30 years have witnessed an increase in women’s labour force participation rates in 
the UK from 56% to over 70%
1.  Furthermore, women are expected to fill two thirds of all new 
job creations between 1998 and 2009 in the UK (Wilson and Green (2001)).  Graph 1 
illustrates the recent trend in female labour supply clearly indicating increased participation for 
all women regardless of their fertility
2.  The increase has been explained by, for example, 
higher levels of educational qualifications, rising divorce probabilities, wider availability of 
non-maternal childcare and better control of fertility through improved contraception
 (see, for 
example, Goldin and Katz (2000) for the US or Sprague (1988) for the UK). 
[Graph 1 about here] 
Concomitantly to the increase in participation, Western economies have witnessed a 
decrease in the fertility rate over the same period.  The right-hand side axis in Graph 2 shows 
that over the past 30 years the total fertility rate (TFR) has dropped drastically in the UK 
falling below the replacement rate, while the female labour force participation has increased 
(depicted in the left-hand side axis of Graph 2).  Although the two events may be unrelated, it 
may indicate that many women find it difficult to combine career and fertility decisions.  As an 
example, the 1998 Family Resources Survey reveals that over 20% of UK mothers of pre-
school age children, aged 18-44, stated that childcare obligations restricted them from working.  
Similarly, for the US, Mason and Kuhlthau (1992) find that up to 30% of mothers of pre-
school age children felt constrained in their employment due to child care problems.   
[Graph 2 about here] 
                                                 
1 Labour Force Survey, 1971-1998, including women aged 16-59. 
2 Fertility is defined as a dummy variable taking value 1 for mothers and 0 for non-mothers throughout the paper. 
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 The impact of children on various economic decisions has generated much empirical 
research among economists
3.  Furthermore, many studies have found that a significant portion 
of the gender wage gap can be explained by a “family gap” or the difference in earnings 
between women with children and women without children (see Table 1 for summary of 
results).  Two major hypotheses explaining the mechanism by which mothers earn less than 
childless women with similar characteristics include: (1) individual heterogeneity e.g. 
commitment to work or career orientation, and (2) human capital theory i.e. women with 
children have less accumulated human capital investment due to reduced work experience.  
[Table 1 about here] 
The first explanation for the “family gap” sees no causal link between fertility status and 
pay but instead both motherhood and lower pay result from idiosyncratic preferences regarding 
employment and household production.  This heterogeneity explanation includes the traditional 
models of selection/self-selection into employment as well as selection/self-selection into 
motherhood and household production.  As an example, this explanation of individual 
preferences includes mothers trading off higher pay for mother-friendly, e.g. part-time, 
employment.  Korenman and Neumark (1992), using US data, find that fixed unobservables 
bias cross-sectional estimates of the effects of children on wages.  They conclude that 
assuming the fixed effects estimates are correct, women would not experience any adverse 
effects from motherhood on wages by remaining employed.  The same conclusion is reached 
with Danish data by Datta Gupta and Smith (2001), who find that children do not seem to 
impose any negative effects on mother’s pay in the long run when controlling for fixed effects.  
These conclusions are not confirmed by studies for the US and UK by Waldfogel (1995, 1997, 
1998b), who concludes that lack of opportunities or discrimination, instead of heterogeneity, 
may explain most of the “family gap”.     
                                                 
3 See, for example, Browning (1992) for an extensive literature review of the effects of children on the allocation 
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   The second explanation relies on the human capital theory (see Becker (1981)).  The 
theory predicts that women will have lower wages due to time taken off the labour market due 
to childbearing and specialisation in household production (see Figure 1 for an illustration) as 
well as being less productive at work (see Becker (1985)).  Figure 1 depicts how time taken off 
the labour market can lead to a difference in earnings between mothers and childless women.  
If each year of employment experience increases wages by, say, 1% then women who spend a 
year out will have a 1% wage differential compared to those with continuous employment, 
ceteris paribus.  According to the human capital theory, therefore, the effects of children are 
mostly indirect i.e. reducing wages by reducing mothers’ labour force attachment.  This theory 
is supported by a finding by Datta Gupta and Smith (2001) who discovered that the loss of 
human capital accumulation during childbirth period could result in temporary negative effects 
on wages, while the long run effects are zero.  Korenman and Neumark (1992) find that 
controlling for experience eliminates much of the “family gap”, however, they conclude that 
employment experience is endogenous with respect to wages.  
   









   
                                                                                                                                                          
of expenditure within households and female labour supply. 
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 There has been much talk recently on family friendly policies in the UK in the form of in-
work tax credits, and improved maternity and childcare provision.  The Guardian newspaper 
(9.6.2001) highlights Britain’s paid maternity leave lagging behind all other European 
countries.  The poor record of family friendly policies is topped by a finding by Harkness and 
Waldfogel (1999) that the “family gap” is largest in the UK, followed by US and Germany.  
The “family gap” is found to be virtually non-existent in the Nordic countries.  According to 
their estimation the “family gap” in the UK is approximately 11%.  Browning (1992) states 
that the “family gap” could be eliminated by reducing the cost of childcare to parents while 
Waldfogel (1998a, 1998b) suggests that, as well as affordability and availability of childcare, 
maternity leave can act as an effective remedy for the “family gap” in pay by preventing breaks 
in employment
4. 
Previous research has established the importance of the possible unobserved heterogeneity 
among women in their decision to enter the labour force (see, for example, Heckman and 
Willis (1977) or Shaw (1994)) as well as the potential endogeneity of the fertility status with 
respect to wages (Korenman and Neumark (1992)).  This study differs from the previous 
studies by accounting for both selection into labour force and the endogeneity of fertility in the 
wage equation simultaneously.  Hence this method gives estimates of the impact of children on 
female wages unaffected by the potential heterogeneity and endogeneity biases. 
In the following section, I describe the econometric method used in the analysis.   




2 Econometric  model 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Jacobsen and Levin (1995) or Ruhm (1998) for the impact of breaks in employment at 
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 This paper investigates the impact of children on female wages in the UK.  The wage 
effect of motherhood is estimated by comparing the wages between women with children and 
women without children; the dichotomous variable Fi is 1 for the former and 0 for the latter 
group of women and i refers to an individual.  The econometric method involves using an 
extension of the Roy model, which allows double-selection (see, for example, Fishe et al. 
(1981) or Maddala (1983)) as wages are only observed for participating women.  The two 
selections, fertility and participation, are not assumed to be independent and are hence 
estimated simultaneously. 
For each individual i, we want to calculate the difference in wages between mothers and 
childless women.  The wage equations are estimated as follows
5: 
wX i f F P















      ( 1 )  
where w1 and w2 denote the log wages, X1 and X2 are vectors of controls and η1 and η2  are 
independent and identically distributed disturbances for each individual i. 
However, this is still not a correct estimate of the family gap because mothers and other 
women may also differ by some other characteristics that may explain their fertility decision 
and the wages they obtain.  Therefore the model needs to account for participation in the labour 
force as well as fertility participation.  Participation in labour force for individual i can be 
specified as a latent variable model: 
PZ ii
* =+ γ 1 i ε 1
                                                                                                                                                         
       ( 2 )  












       ( 3 )  
 
childbirth, or parental leave, for women’s pay. 
5 The assumption of pooling of the samples of women with children and those without children is tested 
using the Chow test, the results of which indicate that the null hypothesis of pooling is rejected (p-value 0.003).  
Therefore, I estimate separate wage equations.  
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 where Pi
* is a latent variable for the propensity to participate in the labour force, Zi is a vector 
of personal, household and economic characteristics affecting individual i, and ε1i are N(0,1) 
disturbances.  Similarly, individual i's decision to enter motherhood can be estimated using the 
following latent variable model: 
FW ii i
* =+ γ 2 ε 2
η ε 1 2
                                                                                                                                                         
       ( 4 )  




















*        ( 5 )  
where  Wi  includes controls for personal, household and economic characteristics affecting 
individual i and ε2i are N(0,1) disturbances. 
Since we do not assume the independence of the various disturbance terms, the full 
stochastic specification of the error terms in equations (1), (2) and (4) assuming normality is 
























































~;      ( 6 )  
 
The four terms in the upper right-hand corner of the variance-covariance matrix determine the 
sample selection effects due to participation (indicated by subscript ε1) and fertility (indicated 
by subscript ε2) on the wage equations for women with children (indicated by subscript η1) and 
childless women (indicated by subscript η2).  Furthermore, σε1ε2 represents the correlation 
between the participation decision and the fertility outcome that can originate from 
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 Modelling the two decisions simultaneously requires the estimation of (1), (2) and (4) 
jointly by maximum likelihood or by Heckman two-step method for consistent estimates.  The 
estimation of γ1,  γ2 and σε1ε2  in the selection equations (2) and (4) is performed using a 
bivariate probit estimation.  These estimates are then used to construct Inverse Mills Ratios, 
which are included in the second step equation to correct the ordinary least squares (OLS) of 
selection biases.  Hence the conditional expectations of the log wage equations for women with 
children and women without children are as follows: 
EWF P X M M
EWF P X M M
ii i i
ii i i
(ln | , )
(ln | , )
11 1 1 1 2





= 1 2 1
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    ( 7 )  
where M12 and M34 give the propensity to participate in the labour force for women with 
children and no children respectively, and M21 and M43 give the propensity to enter motherhood 
and not have children respectively
6.  Appendix 1 shows the special form that the Inverse Mills 
Ratios take when σε1ε2, or the correlation between the two selection equations, is significantly 
different from zero.   
The double selection model corrects simultaneously for the endogeneity of labour force 
participation and fertility.  However, besides the double-selection model results, I present OLS 
and IV estimates for comparison purposes to study the impact of children on female wages.  
The relationship between and discussion on selection models and IV approaches is reviewed in 
Blundell and Powell (2003).     
 
3 Data   
The National Child Development Study (NCDS) is a longitudinal survey following all 
individuals born in Britain during the first week of March 1958.  The NCDS was planned as a 
perinatal mortality survey with follow-ups at age 7, 11, 16, 23 and 33.  This analysis uses the 
  8 
 fifth wave, which was conducted in 1991 when the respondents were 33 years old
7.  The fifth 
wave includes 5799 women.  The sample is selected by including women who are married or 
cohabiting, which brings the sample size to 4742 observations.  I concentrate on married or 
cohabiting women only because a live-in partnership is more likely to maximise a collective 
utility function and hence take into account the activities and income of other household 
members
8.  It would be also interesting to include single women in the analysis, however, since 
their labour force participation decisions are so different from women with a partner this would 
cause modelling problems as well as problems with the sample size with the NCDS data.  
The final sample size is reduced to 2414 observations because information on the wages for 
working women (419 observations), employment or marital status (227 observations), or the 
identifying variables used in the analysis (427 observations for participation identifier and 
1255 observations for fertility identifier) are missing
9.   
The variables used in the analysis are summarised in Table 2.  The summary table 
indicates that the average number of children for the sample is 1.71.  Table 2 also reports 
selected summary statistics from a sample drawn from the 1991 Labour Force Survey (LFS).  
LFS is used to check that the NCDS sample is representative of the general population.  The 
sample is selected in such way that it can be compared to the NCDS sample used in the 
analysis.  Due to relatively small sample sizes in the LFS when using only those born in 1958, 
I have instead used a five-year age band from the LFS.  Hence the sample includes women 
aged 31-35, who are married or cohabiting. 
[Table 2 about here] 
                                                                                                                                                          
6 The equations for the wages of women who do not work are omitted since they are not observed, however, the 
full model can be found in Fishe et al. (1981). 
7 An advantage of the data is that it looks at a cohort of women and is therefore exempt of cohort effects, see, for 
example, Blundell and Walker (1986) on the impact of cohort effects on female labour supply. 
8 I used the Chow test to examine the appropriateness of pooling.  The null hypothesis of pooling cannot be 
rejected with a probability value of 0.161, hence concluding that pooling of the married and cohabiting women is 
appropriate. 
9 These variables are found to be missing at random hence not biasing the results. 
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 The slight difference in the proportions of full-time and part-time workers and 
housewives is more likely to reflect the difference in the variable definitions between the 
datasets rather than any more serious bias.  There are also problems with the fertility, number 
of children and the presence of pre-school age children variables when comparing the two 
datasets.  The fertility rate and the number of children variables are at lower levels in the 
NCDS than in the LFS while the number of pre-school age children is higher in the NCDS.  It 
is feasible that the women in the NCDS sample are further from their completed family size 
than the women in the LFS sample.  However, since the discrepancy is not large, the sample is 
broadly representative of the population under study.   
Table 3 summarises the economic status of women without any children, children older 
than five, or children less than five years of age.  The cross-tabulation excludes the 
unemployed married (or partnered) women (48 observations).  Only 1 in 6 married (or 
partnered) women have not entered motherhood by the age of 33.  Table 3 clearly shows that 
the majority of women with no children are employed full-time.  However, the presence of 
children seems to increase participation in part-time employment as opposed to full-time 
employment regardless of the age of the youngest child.  Furthermore, 1 in 4 women with 
school-age children are housewives.  This proportion jumps to over 50% when the children are 
pre-school age.  Hence, according to this preliminary analysis, the presence of children has a 
clear effect on women’s employment outcomes. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
4  Model identification and results 
4.1   Model identification 
The impact of the presence of children on women’s earnings is estimated using the model 
presented in Section 2.  The advantage of this method is that it simultaneously accounts for the 
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 selection into motherhood and selection into labour force participation thus correcting any bias 
resulting from individual heterogeneity and the endogeneity of fertility.  Previous studies by 
Korenman and Neumark (1992) and Waldfogel (1995, 1997, 1998b) have relied on removing 
the individual heterogeneity with fixed effects, however, this relies on a strong identifying 
assumption that the unmeasured variable is fixed over time with a constant coefficient.   
I also report an instrumental variable (IV) model (Model 2) using as instruments the same 
variables that are used as identifying variables in the selection model (Model 3).  Furthermore, 
Model 1 presents estimates using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  The main difference between 
Model 2 and Model 3 is the transformation of the predicted probabilities of participation.  The 
appropriateness of both methods relies on the identifying ability of the exclusion variables.  
The exclusion variables need to identify: (1) the propensity to participate in the labour force 
and (2) the propensity to have entered motherhood by age 33.  I will next explain the 
identifying variables used in the analysis and justify their appropriateness below. 
Studies by Heckman and Willis (1977) and Shaw (1994) find that the majority of women 
tend to be either workers or non-workers during their lifecycle.  Furthermore, Shaw (1994) 
states that this lifestyle persistence “results from heterogeneity in person-specific fixed or 
semi-fixed factors such as basic tastes for home-oriented versus career-oriented life style” 
(p.349).  To account for the heterogeneity, Model 2 and Model 3 correct for self-selection into 
the labour force.  Identification is obtained by using attitude to working as an instrument.  This 
is a dichotomous variable indicating the labour force participation of the mother, which can be 
thought to influence daughter’s attitudes towards working or intergenerational transmission of 
preferences in general
10.  The variable is coded 1 if the mother was working when the NCDS 
child was age 11, which is highly correlated with participation in the labour force at age 33 
                                                 
10 Albrecht et al. (2000), using the International Social Survey Project, compare attitudes towards working 
mothers across countries and examine whether there is a link between the attitudes and actual experience.  They 
find that for women working full-time, their own attitude does not affect the earnings; however, own attitude does 
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 while not being correlated with wages at age 33.  Simple cross-tabulation (not shown but 
results are available upon request from the author) reveals that 65% of those women whose 
mothers in 1970 had been at work since 1965 are working themselves.  This proportion is only 
60% for daughters whose mother was not working (the corresponding figures for part-time 
work at age 33 are 34% and 29%, respectively).    
Models 2 and 3 also correct for the possible endogeneity of fertility and the identification 
strategy relies on the desired size of own family at age 16, which reflects the desired demand 
for children
11.  Graph 3 shows that the probability of having entered motherhood at age 33 is 
higher for those women for whom the desired demand for children was higher at age 16.  Since 
I only have one identifying variable per equation, the commonly used over-identifying 
restrictions tests are unsuitable to test these identifying variables.  However, the identifying 
variables have been tested using procedures proposed by Bound et al. (1994) and Cameron and 
Taber (2000)
12.   
 
4.2   Results  
Tables 4 and 5 present the results of the wage equations (Equation (1) and Equation (7) 
respectively) with alternative model specifications.  The model specifications do not include 
tenure since previous research (see, for example, Korenman and Neumark (1992)) has found it 
to be endogenous
13.  Furthermore, I have not included work experience in the wage equations 
since the women are all the same age and hence the differences in actual work experience vary 
                                                                                                                                                          
affect whether woman will participate in the labour force, hence one can use the attitude as an instrument to 
identify the probability of participation.   
11 This identification strategy may be criticised due to the belief that the life-time decisions regarding fertility and 
education are made at 16, however, the correlation between the identifying variable and years of education is 
negative as expected but not significant with a p-value of 0.9058.  
12 The former states that “partial R
2 and F statistic on the excluded instruments in the first stage regression are 
useful as rough guides to the quality of estimates” while the latter believes that “it is informative to examine the 
relationship between the excluded variables and the observables in the wage equation [whereas a lack of 
relationship] can lend some credence [to the use of the instruments].”  The results of these tests are available on 
request from the author. 
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 only by the level of education and the number of children, the latter of which may be 
endogenous.  Additionally, this study does not account for the part-time wage penalty (see, for 
example, Joshi et al. (1999)) since part-time work is likely to be endogeneous.  This omission 
may lead to an over-estimation of the “family gap”.  The endogeneity of part-time work status 
may result from (1) women preferring to spend more time with her offspring, especially when 
the children are young, and (2) difficulties in finding childcare or full-time employment. 
The results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) specification treating fertility and 
participation as exogenous covariates are reported in the first and second columns of Table 4, 
for childless women and mothers respectively.  As expected, the level of qualification has a 
significant positive relationship with hourly wages at age 33 for both women with children and 
childless women.  Furthermore, the size of the workplace is a significant positive function of 
earnings while union membership is significant only for women with children.   
[Table 4 about here] 
The first column of Table 6 shows the wage differential between women with children 
and childless women not accounting for selection.  The differential is calculated at both 
groups’ mean characteristics and it suggests that women with children are faced with a 19% to 
22% pay penalty compared to their childless counterparts.  This is a substantial drop from the 
40.5% raw wage differential observed between these two groups.  These OLS results confirm 
the findings of previous research by Waldfogel (1995, 1998b), who finds an average wage 
penalty of 20% (for the 1995 study) and 22% (for the 1998b study), both of which use the 
NCDS with fixed effects estimation.  However, since the OLS results are not corrected for the 
potential sources of bias resulting from endogeneity of fertility, individual heterogeneity and 
employment selectivity, they may not estimate the true effect of fertility on wages
14. 
                                                                                                                                                          
13 It is worth noting that alternative tenure-inclusive model specifications were estimated but tenure was not found 
to be significant. 
14 A Durbin-Wu-Hausman test was performed to test endogeneity of fertility.  The results indicate that OLS is not 
consistent.  The test statistic is available from the author on request. 
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 Model 2 and Model 3 in columns 1 through 4 of Table 5 estimate a wage equation, 
using an IV model and a double-selection model respectively, that correct for the potential 
sources of bias associated with unobservable characteristics.  The results of the bivariate probit 
used in the first step of both models is presented in Appendix 1.  This first-step equation 
controls for the qualification level, health, and region at age 16. They also include the 
identifying variables i.e. whether your mother worked when you were age 11 for the 
participation equation and the number of children wanted at age 16 for the fertility equation.  
Also, the correlation between the two first-step equations, σε1ε2,  is highly significant and 
negative indicating that separate probit equations in the first step would bias the results.   
Therefore, the Inverse Mills Ratios take the form shown in Equations (10) and (11).  
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 5 show that qualifications, union status and workplace 
characteristics remain to have a similar effect on wages than in the previously estimated OLS 
specification.  The qualification level and firm size variables give expected results, while the 
union status variable is significant for mothers only.  The selection terms, or the Inverse Mills 
ratios, account for the correlated unobservable characteristics.  By economic theory, these 
unobservables that explain participation should be positively correlated with wages.  Hence, 
lambda for participation gives an estimate for the propensity to participate in the labour force 
accounting for the endogeneity of fertility.  This is significant for women with children i.e. 
Fi=1 in Model 3.  This result is supported by a similar finding of the IV model (Model 2), but 
in this case the coefficients of the instrumented participation are not of the expected sign.  
Nevertheless, these results seem to indicate that labour force participation of mothers is 
endogenous and especially that women with children are constrained in their employment.      
The correction terms for fertility i.e. the propensity for childless women not to have 
children and the propensity for mothers to have children by age 33 are not significantly 
different from zero in either Model 2 or Model 3.  Therefore rather than fertility being 
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 endogenous, it is possible that the timing of the intertwined decisions to participate in the 
labour force and to enter motherhood that is endogeneous.  Accounting for this endogeneity, 
Table 6 confirms that the “family gap” may have been previously over-estimated; the wage 
differential is estimated to fall to 17%-18% using IV estimation and even further to 10%-13% 
using the double-selection model, which is my preferred specification
15.  In other words, 
accounting for selection the “family gap” reduces by half.  This result supports the finding of 
Harkness and Waldfogel (1999), however, it is significantly smaller than the “family gap” 
estimated by Waldfogel (1995), Waldfogel (1998b), or Joshi et al. (1999).  Finally it should be 
noted that the “family gap” estimates might reduce further when accounting for part-time work 
status.   
[Table 6 about here] 
 
5 Conclusions 
This paper has investigated the impact of children on women’s wages in Britain.  Since the 
prime years of fertility and career development coincide, the estimation method accounts for 
the simultaneity of both decisions.  Furthermore, self-selection issues complicate the analysis 
and since the wages of women who abstain from working are non-observable, the econometric 
modelling has to account for the resulting bias. 
This study has re-confirmed the earlier finding of heterogeneity between women who 
participate in the labour force and those who do not.  Selection into employment is found to be 
significant and hence OLS results without correcting for selection are biased.  Simultaneously 
correcting for the selection into employment and motherhood, children are not found to reduce 
the wages between women who have entered motherhood and childless women by as much as 
                                                 
15 It should be noted that models that include terms for work experience still result in a wage differential between  
-5.9% and –10.7% using the double-selection model, while models further including a term for part-time work 
status leads to a differential between –6.8% and –13.5%.  However, due to the potential endogeneity of experience 
and part-time work status terms they are excluded from the preferred specification. 
  15 
 previously estimated.  However, although the “family gap” in wages reduces significantly 
when accounting for individual heterogeneity and the endogeneity of fertility, there still 
remains a 10% to 13% gap in pay between mothers and childless women in the UK.  Further 
research should be undertaken to investigate the reasons for this discrepancy and especially 
whether it may be due to preferences not captured by this analysis, pure discrimination, or to 
policy related issues such as maternity leave and childcare legislation.  It is of policy interest to 
examine whether maternity leave legislation and the availability or the price of childcare have 
an effect on the “family gap”.  However, this analysis cannot shed further light to answer these 
questions.  
This study raises some interesting issues for further research.  First, a method should be 
found to enable the inclusion of variables such as experience and part-time work status in the 
analysis, which are excluded from this analysis due to their potential endogeneity.   
Furthermore, the data used in the analysis does not allow the childcare dimension to be 
included in the analysis.  Second, the measure of fertility used in this study is not ideal and 
instead it would be interesting to incorporate completed fertility or the timing of fertility in the 
model and consequently include women of all ages.  Another data that would serve these 
purposes would also allow examining whether growth in earnings around childbirth is the 
cause for the “family gap”. 
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Note:  Labour force participation rate for the UK. 
Total fertility rate for England and Wales (seasonally adjusted). 
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Note:  Desired demand for 0 or 1 children at age 16 are combined due to small number of observations (40 and 28, respectively). 
Source: NCDS 
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 Table 1  Selected literature on the wage penalty of motherhood 
Study        Data Method Results
Budig, M.J. and England, P. (2001)   1982-1993 NLSY  Fixed  effects  and 
OLS 
Wage penalty 7% per child (5% controlling for work 
experience) 
Penalty larger for married than for unmarried women 
Datta Gupta and Smith (2001)  1980-95 Danish panel Fixed effects  Temporary negative effects 
Hill, M.S. (1979)   1976 PSID  OLS  Wage penalty 6-7% per child  
Penalty disappears when controls included for tenure 
and work experience 
Joshi, H. et al. (1999)  MRC and NCDS  Selection model  Wage penalty for motherhood 33% for both cohorts 
Korenman, S. and Neumark, D. (1992)  1982 NLS-YW  OLS,  first 
difference, fixed
effects, and IV 
 
Wage penalty 7% for one child and 22% for two or 
more children 
Waldfogel, J. (1995)  NCDS  OLS,  first 
differences, and 
fixed effects 
Average wage penalty for motherhood 22% 




Wage penalty 4% for one child and 12% for two or 
more children controlling for work experience and 
part-time employment status 
Waldfogel, J. (1998a)  1980  NLS-YW  and 
1991 NLSY 
OLS  Wage penalty at age 30 17% in 1980 and 25% in 
1991 




Wage penalty 20% for US at age 30 and 20% for UK 
at age 33 
NB.  If one of above studies has more than one sample or method for which analysis is conducted, the results are reported from the one that most closely resembles the 
sample or method of this study. 
Data abbreviations:  MRC    Medical Research Council’s National Survey of Health and Development 
NCDS    National Child Development Survey 
NLSY    National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
NLS-YW  National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women 
    PSID   Panel  Study  of  Income  DynamicsTable 2   Summary statistics (NCDS and LFS) 
  All women  Working women 
  Mean  SE  95% CI (LFS)   Mean   SE  95% CI (LFS) 
Full-time worker  0.3107  (0.4629)  [0.2843, 0.3111]  0.4928  (0.5001)  [0.4416, 0.4779] 
Part-time worker  0.3198  (0.4665)  [0.3359, 0.3638]  0.5072  (0.5001)  [0.5221, 0.5584] 
Housewife            0.3505  (0.4772)  [0.2485, 0.2742] n/a n/a n/a
Fertility  0.8227  (0.3820)  [0.8231, 0.8449]  0.7444  (0.4363)  [0.7605, 0.7908] 
Number of children  1.7129  (1.1098)  [1.7437, 1.8120]  1.4665  (1.0753)  [1.5046, 1.5842] 
Presence of pre-school children   0.5994  (0.7254)  [0.4478, 0.4769]  0.4146  (0.6278)  [0.3520, 0.3871] 
Years of education  12.1689  (0.0391)  [12.075, 12.2081]  12.2068  (0.0507)  [12.1203, 12.2854] 
Bad health  0.1239  (0.3295)  -  0.1091  (0.3118)  - 
Participation identifier   0.6205  (0.4854)  -  -  -  - 
Fertility identifier  2.5365  (0.8795)  -  -  -  - 
Log pay per hour  n/a  n/a  n/a  1.6161  (0.5413)  - 
Union status  n/a  n/a  n/a  0.2786  (0.4484)  [0.31227, 0.3466] 
Number of observations  2414     [4488]  1522     [2906] 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses.  The square brackets display a 95% confidence interval for similarly defined sample, using a five-year age band, from the 1991 
Labour Force Survey (LFS). Table 3  Economic status of women according to level of fertility, number of women 
  Employed full-time  Employed part-time  Housewife  Total 
Women with no offspring  352  37  25  414 
Women with offspring older than 5  227  380  238  845 
Women with offspring younger than 5  171  353  583  1107 
Total 750  770  846  2366 
Note:  Table omits the category of unemployed women (48 observations) 
Source:   National Child Development Study (NCDS) 
 
 
Table 4   Log hourly wages at 33, NCDS (females) 
   Model  1     
  Fi=0   Fi=1   
O levels  0.1936 (0.0717)  ***  0.1927 (0.0302)  *** 
Mid vocational  0.2552 (0.0744)  ***  0.1969 (0.0312)  *** 
A levels  0.4125 (0.0663)  ***  0.4724 (0.0334)  *** 
Degree  0.5910 (0.0660)  ***  0.8508 (0.0606)  *** 
Medium firm (25-100)  0.1400 (0.0598)  **  0.0687 (0.0297)  ** 
Medium large (100-500)  0.1042 (0.0583)  *  0.1251 (0.0327)  *** 
Large (>500)  0.2114 (0.0637)  ***  0.2470 (0.0403)  *** 
Union status  -0.0304 (0.0367)    0.1936 (0.0291)  *** 
Lambda: participation  n/a    n/a   
Lambda: fertility  n/a    n/a   
Constant  1.4125 (0.0783)  ***  1.0809 (0.0379)  *** 
Observations 445    1317  
R
2/Pseudo R
2 0.18    0.33   
Note:   Model 1 estimates OLS; specification includes regional dummies, and dummies for missing bad health and qualification variables. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Standard errors in Model 1 corrected for heteroscedasticity. 






 Table 5   Log hourly wages at 33, NCDS (females) 
 
   Model  2       Model  3     
  Fi=0   Fi=1   F i=0  Fi=1   
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Observations  389   1133    389   1133   
R
2/Pseudo R
2  0.14   0.32   0.14    0.32   
Note:    Model 2 estimates an instrumental variable model; model 3 estimates a double-selection model; both are identified with the 
following variables: participation with variable “mother worked since age 11” and fertility with variable “size of own family 
wanted at age 16”.   
Specifications include regional dummies, and dummies for missing bad health, region and qualification variables. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Standard errors in model 2 and model 3 obtained by bootstrapping (1000 replications). 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 6  Wage differentials between women with children and women without children 
 Raw 
differential 
OLS IV  Double 
selection 
X  evaluated at F=0  -40.5% -18.8% -15.6%    -10.2%   
X  evaluated at F=1  -40.5%  -22.1%   -18.4%   -13.1%  
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 Appendix 1:   Determinants of participation and motherhood for Model 2 and Model 3 using a 
bivariate probit 
 Coefficient  Standard  Deviation   
Participation     
Participation identifier  0.1732  (0.0524)  *** 
O levels  0.1272  (0.0751)  * 
Mid vocational  0.1778  (0.0788)  ** 
A levels  0.4055  (0.0834)  *** 
Degree 0.3809  (0.0989)  *** 
Bad health  -0.1726  (0.0794)  ** 
Constant -0.0617  (0.1273)  
Fertility      
Fertility identifier 0.0915  (0.0335)  *** 
O levels  -0.3549  (0.0965)  *** 
Mid vocational  -0.3716  (0.0997)  *** 
A levels  -0.5174  (0.1009)  *** 
Degree -0.8944  (0.1106)  *** 
Bad health  0.0902  (0.0992)   
Constant 1.0573  (0.1754) *** 
Observations 2414     
σε1ε2  -0.5510 (0.0339)  *** 
Log likelihood  -2541.52     
Note:    Model 2 estimates an instrumental variable model; model 3 estimates a double-selection model; both are identified with the 
following variables: participation with variable “mother worked since age 11” and fertility with variable “size of own family 
wanted at age 16”.  
Specifications include dummies for region at age 16, and dummies for missing bad health, region and qualification variables. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Standard errors in model 2 and model 3 obtained by bootstrapping (1000 replications). 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
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 Appendix 1: Construction of the Inverse Mills Ratios 
 
The construction of the Inverse Mills ratios depends crucially on the significance of the 
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where  φ and Φ are, respectively, the density and cumulative distribution function of the 
Normal distribution.  However, if σε1ε2 ≠ 0 the Inverse Mills ratios take a special form in order 
to correct the estimates for the correlation between the two selection equations: 
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where φ and Φ are defined above. 
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